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WALKING ON THIN ICE: THE CHANGING
LIABILITY OF ATTORNEYS IN THE
SECURITIES ARENA
SCOTT A. CRIST*
INTRODUCTION

The position that securities lawyers hold within the legal community differs, both in form and in substance, from that of most
other practitioners. Securities lawyers play a "unique and pivotal
role in the effective implementation of the securities laws,"' and
since the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) does not have
sufficient resources to detect or investigate all securities law violations, it is often up to the securities lawyer to ensure that the public
does not fall victim to fraudulent conduct. This unique position has
been the subject of discussion by courts and commentators concerning the adequacy of current standards of professional responsibility
with respect to securities lawyers.
This Article discusses the changing liability of securities lawyers. Part I discusses the liability of securities lawyers under the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Part II discusses the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny
Stock Reform Act of 1990 (SERPSRA). Finally, Part III analyzes
the recent Supreme Court decision in Central Bank of Denver v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver.2 This discussion will hopefully
serve to underscore the recent uncertainty in potential liability that
securities lawyers face, both through insufficient and volatile
Supreme Court decisions, and through newly acquired SEC administrative remedies.
I.

LLABILITY OF SECURITIES LAWYERS UNDER THE

1933

AND

1934

ACTS

In the aftermath of the Stock Market Crash of 1929, Congress
enacted the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934. 3 In doing so, Congress attempted to provide protection for
* B.A. 1991, Univ. of Missouri-Columbia; J.D. 1993, Univ. of MissouriKansas City; Associate with the firm of Mustain, Higgins, Kolich, Lysaught &
Tomasic, Chartered.
1. SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., [1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
t 93,631 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1972).
2. 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
3. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976).
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the investing public that had previously been lacking by imposing
broad disclosure requirements upon those offering securities to the
public, and thereafter, through regular reporting requirements to
the Securities and Exchange Commission by those listed on the national securities exchanges. 4 In an effort to provide some means of
ensuring that the requirements imposed by the Acts were faithfully
carried out, and to prevent inadequate or inaccurate disclosure during the issuance of securities, Congress included several flexible enforcement powers which, after 1934, the SEC could invoke, along
with broad rulemaking authority in the Commission to promulgate
5
rules consistent with the provisions of the Acts.
A.

Rule 2(e)(1)

Rule 2(e)(1) 6 provides:
[tihe Commission may deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege
of appearing or practicing before it in any way to any person who is
found by the Commission after notice of and opportunity for hearing in
the matter (i) not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent
others, or (ii) to be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged
in unethical or improper professional conduct, or (iii) to have willfully
violated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation of any provision of
the federal 7 securities laws

.

.

.

or the rules and regulations

thereunder.
The most relevant portions of this Rule for securities lawyers
have historically been sections (ii) and (iii). In 1981, the Commission had the opportunity in In re Carters to set forth the standard of
conduct required of securities lawyers under both of these sections.
The Commission stated that Rule 2(e) was not promulgated to create a new administrative remedy, but rather to address the problem of professional misconduct. 9 Rule 2(e)'s sanction, therefore, is
limited to that necessary to protect the investing public and the
4. Id. at 195.
5. Id.

6. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1) (1992).

7. Id.
8. [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)

82,847 (S.E.C. Feb.

28, 1981). In Carter,the attorneys, Carter and Johnson, acting as outside counsel for National Telephone Company, were found to have "willfully aided and
abetted violations of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5," and to have "engaged in
unethical and improper professional conduct" by the Administrative Law Judge
when National failed to make requisite disclosures concerning its financial condition contrary to their directions. Id. at 84, 146. In its decision, the SEC reversed the findings of the Administrative Law Judge. Id. at 84, 173. However,
the SEC stated prospectively that, when a lawyer with significant responsibilities in the effectuation of a company's compliance with the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws becomes aware that his client is engaged in
a substantial and continuing failure to satisfy those disclosure requirements,
his continued participation violates professional standards unless he takes
prompt steps to end the client's noncompliance. Id.
9. Id. at 84,149.
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Commission from the potential impact of misconduct by the attorneys, accountants, and other professionals that practice before it.' 0
In applying section (ii) of Rule 2(e)(1), which prohibits unethical or improper professional conduct, the Commission stated that
some prompt action is necessary when the lawyer "becomes aware
that his client ...engage[s] in a substantial and continuing failure
to satisfy disclosure requirements."" However, "[s]o long as a lawyer is acting in good faith and exerting reasonable efforts to prevent
violations of the law by his client, his professional obligations have
been met."12 Although the Commission in Carter indicated that
section (ii) may create additional duties of disclosure beyond those
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, it declined to expand
existing ethical and professional standards, referring instead to a
release to be issued in the future by the Commission further defining the obligations of securities lawyers. 13 The Commission, how14
ever, has never issued the future release promised in Carter.
With regard to section (iii) of Rule 2(e)(1), although it did not
decide what level of intent was required for an attorney to be held
liable as an aider and abettor, the Commission in In re Carter held
that liability under section (iii) required a showing of awareness or
knowledge on the part of the attorney that their role was part of an
activity that was improper or illegal.' 5 The Commission stated that
"the traditional role of the lawyer as counselor is to advise his client, not the public, about the law, [and] Rule 2(e) does not change
16
the nature of that obligation."
As a practical matter, despite its broad language and promise
of future releases increasing the obligations of securities lawyers,
Rule 2(e)(1) has not been a significant factor in defining attorney
liability under the 1933 and 1934 Acts. In fact, "cases upholding
sanctions imposed under Rule 2(e) do so primarily by way of
7
dicta."'
10. Id. at 84,150.

11. Id. at 84,172.
12. Id. at 84,172-73.
13. In re Carter, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,847,
at 84,170 (S.E.C. Feb. 28, 1991).
14. See LARRY D. SODERQUIST, SECURITIES REGULATION 610 (2d ed. 1988).
15. In re Carter, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 82,847,

at 84,176. "If a securities lawyer is to bring his best judgment to bear on a
disclosure problem, he must have the freedom to make innocent - or even, in
certain cases, careless - mistakes without fear of legal liability or loss of the
ability to practice before the Commission." Id. at 84,167.
16. Id. at 84,150.
17. Robert G. Day, Note, Administrative Watchdogs or Zealous Advocates?
Implications for Legal Ethics in the Face of Expanded Attorney Liability, 45
STAN. L. REV. 645, 673 (1993).
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B. Section 15(c)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act
Section 15(c)(4) of the Exchange Act' s provides that, upon a
finding of a failure to comply with certain provisions of the Exchange Act, the Commission
may publish its findings and issue an order requiring [the person failing to comply], and any person who was a cause of the failure to comply
..to comply, or to take steps to effect compliance with such provisions
upon such terms and conditions and within such time as the Com-

...

mission may specify in such order. 19
Administrative enforcement actions may be instituted under
Section 15(c)(4) where the Commission finds a failure to comply
with Sections 12, 13, 14 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act.20 It also "applies whenever the SEC finds that 'any person' knowingly caused
another person's failure to comply with disclosure requirements
under the Act." 21 "In general, lawyers are not liable under [this

section] for the legal advice they give, but they may be liable for the
decisions actually made if they accept a role in the decision-making
process."2 2 This embraces the traditional view of ethics, "which
perceives a lawyer as an adviser and not as a principal actor or
'cause' of violations."2 3
After providing the respondent with notice and an opportunity
for a hearing, the Commission may also issue an order requiring
the respondent "to comply, or to take steps to effect compliance with
such provisions.., upon such terms and conditions and within such
time as the Commission may specify." 2 4 However, because SERPSRA provides even broader authority to order compliance, or steps
25
to effect compliance, through a permanent cease-and-desist order,
26 Furthermore, the recent
Section 15(c)(4) is virtually superfluous.
decision in In re Kern2 7 substantially curbed the SEC's authority
18.
19.
82,006
20.

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(c)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 15(c)(4) (1993).
In re Kern, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.(CCH) 84,815, at
(S.E.C. Jun. 21, 1991).
Harvey L. Pitt, Report of the Task Force on SEC Settlements of the Sub-

committee on Civil Litigation and SEC Enforcement Matters of the Federal Securities Law Committee of the American Bar Association Section of Business

Law, in Bus. LAw 1992, at 101 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook
Series No. H4-5138, 1992).
21. Day, supra note 17, at 675.

22. Arthur F. Mathews et al., Liability Exposure of Attorneys in the Corpo-

rate Arena and the Limits of Advocacy C859 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 841, 857 (1993).
23. Day, supra note 17, at 675.
24. In re Kern, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,815, at
82,006 (June 21, 1991).

25. See Part II for a discussion of SERPSRA.
26. Pitt, supra note 20, at 115.
27. In re Kern, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,815
(S.E.C. June 21, 1991). "In Kern, the SEC brought an administrative action
under Section 15(c)(4) against George Kern, a prominent mergers and acquisitions attorney, alleging that he caused a failure to comply with Section 14(d)(4)
of the 1934 Act, which requires the reporting of negotiations in response to a
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under Section 15(c)(4).2 s
In upholding the Administrative Law Judge's ruling in Kern,
the SEC held that section 15(c)(4) was not intended to impose orders of general future compliance with the securities laws. 2 9 Congress intended the SEC to address only the conduct of the
particular issuer who already had failed to comply with the disclosure rules, not other issuers with whom the securities lawyer might
come in contact in the future. 30 Although the decision of the SEC in
Kern referred to the legislative history of Section 15(c)(4) as a basis
for limiting the remedies available under that section, the more
plausible explanation for the Commission's decision seems to be its
developing predisposition for seeking expansion of the agency's authority under SERPSRA rather than under the less certain author31
ity provided by Section 15(c)(4).
C.

Section 11 of the 1933 Act

Section 1132 provides a civil remedy when a registration statement contains "an untrue statement of a material fact or [omits] to
state a material fact [required to be stated therein or] necessary...
to make the statements [therein] not misleading." 33 Joint and several liability is incurred under this section by the issuer, all members of its board, and all who sign the prospectus or are named as
preparing it. 3 4 "Each defendant other than the issuer, [however],
has a defense, called a due diligence defense, that provides an es35
cape from liability."
Under Section 11(b)(3)(A) and (C), a person, other than the issuer, will not be liable if, after reasonable investigation, he had reasonable grounds to believe that the statement was true and that no
tender offer."

Richard M. Phillips & Christian E. Plaza, Insider Trading,

Fraud,and FiduciaryDuty Under the FederalSecurities Laws: Implementation
of the Remedies Act, C873 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 205, 216 (1993). However, as Kern no

longer represented Allied in the matter, the Administrative Law Judge declined
to issue an order of future compliance under Section 15(c)(4) with respect to
Kern "because Kern was no longer in a position either to require Allied to make

corrective filings or to control its future compliance." Kern, [1991 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,815, at 82,005. The Administrative Law

Judge concluded that issuance of an order was beyond his authority under
these circumstances, and accordingly, discontinued the proceedings. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 82,008.
30. Id. at 82,005.
31. See SEC DiscontinuesKern ProceedingsBased on Lack of Statutory Authority, 23 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 997 (June 28, 1991).
32. Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 11 (1988).
33. SODERQUIST, supra note 14, at 237.
34. Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 494 (7th
Cir. 1986).

35.

SODERQUIST,

supra note 14, at 238.
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material fact was omitted. 36 Section 11(c) defines reasonable investigation and reasonable ground for belief as "that required of a prudent man in the management of his own property."3 7 Escott v.
Barchris Construction Corporation3s helped to clarify what consti-

tuted a "reasonable investigation" and a "reasonable belief." An attorney is generally not considered an expert within the meaning of
Section 11. 39 However, "an attorney can be sued ... as an expert
responsible for preparation of specific portions of a registration
statement, such as tax or patent opinions, to which his name is attached."40 In such cases, the attorney would only incur liability
41
with regard to the portion of the statement that he "expertised."
In discussing the standard of inquiry required of an attorney
under Section 11 concerning the unexpertised portions of the registration statement, the court in Escott stated, "To require an audit
would obviously be unreasonable. On the other hand, to require a
check of matters easily verifiable is not unreasonable." 4 2 Therefore,
in order to satisfy the requirements of due diligence, an attorney
must, at the very least, "test oral information by examining the
original written documents," and he must make inquiries of information which he does not know that "would put him on his
guard."43
D. Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act
Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 4 4 which applies only to sellers,

provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or
indirectly: (1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or (3) to engage in any
transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would
45
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
This section contains no requirement that the alleged violator
36.
1968).
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 682-83 (S.D.N.Y.
283 F. Supp. 643, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
Id. at 683.
Mathews et al., supra note 22, at 852.
Id.
Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
Id. at 690, 692.
Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. 77q(a) (1988).
Id.
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act with scienter. 4 6 Accordingly, the Second Circuit in SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd.47 held that an attorney, who had only negligently issued
an opinion letter, had nevertheless violated Section 17(a). 48 The
court specifically relied on the fact that "the legal profession plays a
unique and pivotal role in the effective implementation of the securities laws," asserting that "the public trust demands more of its
legal advisers than 'customary' activities which prove to be care50
less." 49 The Supreme Court later held, however, in Aaron v. SEC,
that the SEC must prove scienter in actions under Section 17(a)(1),
but held that scienter is not required under Sections 17(a)(2) or
51
17(a)(3), permitting negligence to form the basis of liability.
The first case to adequately provide some guidelines as to what
is expected of securities lawyers under Section 17(a), and one which
sent the securities industry into a tailspin upon its release, was
SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp.52 In National Student
Marketing, attorneys to a merger transaction allowed approval of
the merger by the shareholders on the basis of materially misleading information. 5 3 The Court held that the attorneys had aided and
abetted the violations under Sections 17(a), 10(b), and Rule lOb-5
through their participation in the closing of the merger since they
were generally aware of the fraudulent activity, and they knowingly provided substantial assistance to the violation. 54 The court
concluded that, "at the very least, they were required to speak out
at the closing concerning the obvious materiality of the information," and not allow the merger to be closed "until the adjustments
were disclosed and approval of the merger was again obtained from
the shareholders." 55 "Their silence was not only a breach of this
duty to speak, but in addition lent the appearance of legitimacy to
the closing." 56 The Court declined, however, to grant the injunctive
relief requested by the SEC, since there did not exist a reasonable
57
likelihood of future illegal conduct by the attorney defendants.
46. Day, supra note 17, at 672.
47. [1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
10, 1972).

93,631 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
51. Id. at 701-02.
52. 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
53. Id. at 713.
54. Id. at 715.
55. Id. at 713.
56. Id.
57. SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 716 (D.D.C.
1978). Although sanctions were not imposed, the decision in NationalStudent
Marketing was ground-breaking in its recognition of attorney liability for the
failure to disclose material information in a securities transaction. The court
attempted to ease the impact of its decision, however, by stating that, "Courts

will not lightly overrule an attorney's determination of materiality and the need
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E. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act
Section 10(b) 58 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails,
or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary 59
or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
In 1942, acting pursuant to its rulemaking power conferred by
section 10(b), the Commission promulgated Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails
or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon0 any person, in connection
6
with the purchase or sale of any security.
"Although section 10(b) does not by its terms create an express
civil remedy for its violation, and there is no indication that Congress, or the Commission when adopting Rule 10b-5, contemplated
such a remedy, the existence of a private cause of action for violations of the statute and the Rule is now well established." 6' Primary liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 requires direct
participation in the deceit at issue. 6 2 "The elements of a claim of
primary liability are (1) a misstatement or an omission (2) of material fact (3) made with scienter (4) on which plaintiff relied (5) that
for disclosure . . .[but] where . . .the significance of the information clearly

removes any doubt concerning the materiality of the information, attorneys
cannot rest on asserted 'business judgments' as justification for their failure to
make a legal decision pursuant to their fiduciary responsibilities to client
shareholders." Id. at 713-14.
58. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
59. Id.
60. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993).
61. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976).
62. Mercer v. Jaffe, Snider, Raitt & Heuer, 713 F. Supp. 1019, 1025
(W.D.Mich. 1989), aff'd, 933 F.2d 1008 (6th Cir. 1991). "A person undertaking
to furnish information which contains a material misstatement or omission is a
primary participant, so long as he or she is not so far removed from the transmission of the misleading information that liability would necessarily become
vicarious." Id. (citing SEC v. Washington Co. Util. Dist., 676 F.2d 218, 223-24
(6th Cir. 1982).
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proximately caused his injury." 63 "Thus, to prosecute charges
brought under Rule 10b-5, the SEC must show that the alleged violator acted with scienter, or a state of mind embracing an intent to
64
deceive."
The Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder6 5 defined
"scienter" as a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. 66 The legal definition of scienter, however, also
includes recklessness. 67 Whether recklessness is sufficient to satisfy the level of scienter required by Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
remains the subject of much debate. In Ernst & Ernst, the Court
noted in footnote 12 of its opinion that "in certain areas of the law
recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct for
purposes of imposing liability" but declined to address the question
of whether reckless behavior would be sufficient to create civil liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 68 Therefore, until the
Supreme Court has occasion to revisit the issue of scienter, it appears that legal scholars on both sides of the issue will continue to
espouse policy arguments, statutory interpretations, and a self-proclaimed superior understanding of Congressional intent, while the
appellate courts remain split in their opinions and continue to provide little guidance for the securities practitioner.
Another source of conflict under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of
the securities laws involves the issue of whether attorneys can be
held liable absent an existing duty to disclose information to the
third party. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Abell v. Potomac
Insurance Co.,69 attempted to resolve this issue by stating that primary liability cannot be brought against attorneys under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 absent a duty to disclose. 70 "Such a duty
arises only when an attorney either owes a fiduciary duty to the
third party investor, or makes materially false statements, with scienter, that are authorized and intended for the use of third party
63. Gilmore v. Berg, 761 F. Supp. 358, 368 (D.N.J. 1991).
64. Day, supra note 17, at 672.

65. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
66. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976).
67. The Third Circuit has defined recklessness as "highly unreasonable con-

duct, involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, which presents a danger
of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so
obvious that the actor must have been aware of it." Gilmore, 761 F. Supp. at
370.
68. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12.
69. Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir., 1988), vacated on
other grounds, 492 U.S. 914 (1989).
70. Id. at 1126. Although recognizing that securities lawyers often play a

pivotal role in securities transactions, the court in Abell supported its decision
that liability depends on an existing duty to disclose by stating that "an award
of damages under the securities laws is not the way to blaze the trail toward
improved ethical standards in the legal ... profession." Id.
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investors, such as where an attorney issues a formal opinion regarding tax or patent issues." 7 1 The court supported its decision by
stating that "an award of damages under the securities laws is not
the way to blaze the trail toward improved ethical standards in the
legal profession." 72
II.

THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT REMEDIES AND PENNY STOCK

REFORM ACT OF

1990

A. Analysis of the Specific Provisions of the Act
In 1990, Congress enacted the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act (SERPSRA).7 3 As a reaction to
perceived deficiencies in existing remedies, "[t]his landmark legislation changed dramatically the law enforcement profile of the Securities and Exchange Commission." 74 SERPSRA was not enacted
as a separate provision under the securities law, but rather consists
of several provisions that were inserted by amendment into various
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of
1934. The following is a brief summary of the relevant provisions.
1. Cease and Desist Orders
The SEC first requested cease and desist authority in a proposal introduced by Chairman Breeden at the February 1, 1990, Senate Subcommittee hearings, which had been scheduled to focus
upon the then-existing Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act
of 1989. 75 "Because no draft of the Breeden Testimony or the Feb-

ruary 1990 Proposal was circulated beforehand, those testifying
were required to respond without preparation
to the proposal as de76
scribed by Chairman Breeden that day."
According to the Senate Report, Congress had three purposes
behind its creation of the SEC's cease and desist authority. "First,
Congress sought to provide the SEC with greater flexibility to address securities violations." 77 "Second, Congress believed that this
authority would provide a 'more effective remedy' than was cur71. Mathews et al., supra note 22, at 849.
72. Abell, 858 F.2d at 1126.
73. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990

Pub. L. No. 101-429, § 102, 104 Stat. 931, 933-34 (1990).
74. Harvey L. Pitt & Dixie L. Johnson, The Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990: Provisions and Implications of the
New Remedies Available to the SEC, PLI Corp. Law & Practice Handbook Series No. 718, 1990.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Phillips & Plaza, supra note 27, at 214. "The Committee believe[d] the
power to impose a cease and desist order would enhance the SEC's ability to
flexibly tailor remedies to the facts and circumstances of a particular case." Id.
at 214-15.
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rently available under Section 15(c)(4) of the Exchange Act."7 8 Finally, Congress sought to address what it saw as a disparity in the
SEC's enforcement powers when compared with those of other fed79
eral agencies.
The SEC's cease and desist authority under SERPSRA includes
both permanent and temporary cease and desist authority. "In administrative proceedings, the SEC... may enter a permanent cease
and desist order against any person who violates or is about to violate any provision of the federal securities laws, or against any person who causes such a violation". 0 Since the Act's cease and desist
provisions are patterned after Section 15(c)(4) of the 1934 Act, it
seems clear, based upon the language "knew or should have
known," that the SEC will take the position that negligence is sufficient for a "cause" finding in connection with a cease and desist order....81 "This would be consistent with the SEC staff arguments
and the decision of the Administrative Law Judge in In re George C.
Kern."s2
The SEC may enter temporary cease and desist orders against
regulated entities and their associated persons with or without
prior notice and opportunity for hearing.8 3 This provision "clearly
has been the most controversial measure in SERPSRA, since it allows the SEC to unilaterally issue an emergency order temporarily
restricting activities pending completion of a permanent cease and
78. Id. at 215.
79. Id. "[O]f all the federal financial regulatory agencies, only the SEC [did]
not have authority to issue a cease and desist order." Id.
80. Id. at 209. The Act specifically provides that:
If the Commission finds, after notice and opportunity for hearing, that any
person is violating, has violated, or is about to violate any provision ...the
Commission may publish its findings and enter an order requiring such
person, and any other person that is, was, or would be a cause of the viola-

tion, due to an act or omission the person knew or should have known
would contribute to such violation, to cease and desist from committing or

causing such violation and any future violation of the same provision ...
Such order may, in addition, require such person to comply ... with such

provision.., upon such terms and conditions and within such time as the
Commission may specify in such order.

Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-429, § 102, 104 Stat. 931, 933-34 (1990).
81. Phillips & Plaza, supra note 27, at 215-16.
82. Id. at 216.
83. Id. at 209. The Act provides that:
Whenever the Commission determines that the alleged violation or
threatened violation ... is likely to result in significant dissipation or conversion of assets, significant harm to investors, or substantial harm to the
public interest ...

the Commission may enter a temporary order requiring

the respondent to cease and desist from the violation or threatened violation . . . as the Commission deems appropriate pending completion of such
proceeding. Such an order shall be entered only after notice and opportunity for a hearing, unless the Commission determines that notice and hearing prior to entry would be impracticable or contrary to the public interest.
§ 102, 104 Stat. at 934.
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desist proceeding, rather than bothering to go to court." 84 Since the
Commission's determination that notice is unnecessary, it is possible that the SEC will be the party that determines an order should
be issued, the party will issue the order, and will also hears the
85
initial appeal from the order.
The temporary cease and desist order, however, may only be
entered against regulated entities and their associated persons,
which include brokers, dealers, investment advisers, investment
companies, municipal securities dealers, government securities brokers, government securities dealers or transfer agents, or persons
acting in those capacities, or persons associated with such persons,
86
or persons seeking to become associated with such persons.
Although intended to limit the number of persons subject to a temporary cease and desist order, "regulated entity" is defined so
broadly as to bring most persons within its purview.
In support of the SEC's newly acquired cease and desist authority, Commissioner Edward Fleischman pointed out at the annual gathering of the ABA's Business Law Section that banking
regulators were given cease and desist and other powers in the Fi87
nancial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act.
"Moreover, because court calendars are crowded, the SEC needs
cease and desist authority so that some cases - which would be too
old when they finally get before a judge - can be heard on an accelerated basis."8 8 In addition, SEC Associate Enforcement Director
Harry Weiss stated that pursuing a cease and desist order has some
advantages over seeking injunctive relief,8 9 "For example, the
Commission does not have to show the likelihood of future violation
with a cease and desist order."90 Consequently, "temporary cease
and desist orders would be useful for emergency situations." 9 1
2. Administrative Orders for Accounting and Disgorgement in
Cease and Desist Proceedings
"Prior to the passage of SERPSRA, the SEC did not have the
84. Pitt & Johnson, supra note 74.
85. Id.
86. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-429, § 102, 104 Stat. 931, 934 (1990).
87. ABA Group Opposes SEC Remedies Bill; C&D Section Especially Con-

troversial, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 548 (1990) [hereinafter ABA Group]
("The Commission should get a similar boost," he said, "so that people don't do
something on the securities side rather than the banking side just because the
SEC lacks cease and desist authority.")
88. Id.
89. Cease-And-DesistAuthority May Have Limited Use, SEC Staff Officials

Say, 23 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 369 (1991).
90. Id.
91. Id.
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express authority to order an accounting and disgorgement .... 92
The SEC was limited to injunction actions in order to obtain such
relief."93 SERPSRA provides that "[i]n any cease-and-desist proceeding.., the Commission may enter an order requiring accounting and disgorgement, including reasonable interest."94 Further
the Commission can adopt rules and regulations "concerning payments to investors, rates of interest, periods of accrual, and such
other matters as it deems appropriate to implement [orders for accounting and disgorgement. " 95 As such rules have yet to be
96
adopted, the exact scope of this newfound authority is unclear.
However, "[b]ecause the remedy is available expressly in cease and
desist proceedings, as well as SEC administrative proceedings in
which monetary penalties could be imposed, the remedy is available
"9 7
against virtually everyone.
3. Money Penalties
a.

Court Ordered Monetary Penalties (Civil Actions)

The Act provides that, "Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person has violated any provision.., the Commission may bring an action . . . to seek, and the court shall have
jurisdiction to impose, upon a proper showing, a civil penalty to be
paid by the person who committed such violation."9 8 The broad language of this provision allows the SEC to seek money penalties in
the federal district courts against any person that appears to have
violated any provision of the federal securities laws, including cease
and desist orders pursuant to this Act. 99
"Although the penalty to be imposed is determined in light of
the facts and circumstances of each case, SERPSRA establishes a
three-tier structure for determining the penalty in a given case,
with penalties increasing with each tier." 10 0 "The selection of the
proper tier is based upon the level of culpability of the wrongdoer
and the actual or potential amount of harm caused." 10 1 In each
case, however, the court may disregard the tier limit and impose a
penalty equal to "the gross amount of pecuniary gain to such de92. Phillips & Plaza, supra note 27, at 221.

93. Id.
94. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-429, § 102, 104 Stat. 931, 935 (1990).
95. Id.
96. Phillips & Plaza, supra note 27, at 222.
97. Pitt &'Johnson, supra note 74.
98. Securites Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-429, § 102, 104 Stat. 931, 932 (1990).
99. See Phillips & Plaza, supra note 27, at 208.

100. Id.
101. Id.
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fendant as a result of the violation" if that amount is greater. l0 2
"SERPSRA provides that these monetary penalties are not to be
considered an exclusive remedy, and that an action to seek monetary penalties 'may be brought in addition to any other action that
10 3
the Commission or the Attorney General is entitled to bring'."
b.

Monetary Penalties in SEC Administrative Proceedings
SERPSRA provides that:
In any proceeding instituted pursuant to sections 15(b)(4), 15(b)(6),
15B, 15C, or 17A of this title against any person, the Commission...
may impose a civil penalty if it finds, on the record after notice and
opportunity for hearing, that such person:
(1) has willfully violated any provision...
(2) has willfully aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, or
procured such a violation by another person;
(3) has willfully made or caused to be made in any application for registration or report to be filed with the Commission... any statement
which was, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under
which it was made, false or misleading with respect to any material
fact, or has omitted to state in any such application or report any material fact which is required to be stated therein; or
(4) has failed reasonably to supervise... another person who commits
such a violation, if such other person is subject
to his supervision; and
10 4
that such penalty is in the public interest.

"Administrative monetary penalties are imposed under the
same three-tier system employed for the determination of penalties
in civil cases, with one notable exception: For reasons not explained in the legislative history, in administrative proceedings the
SEC is limited to the maximum amounts established for each
tier."l0 5 "[U]nlike federal district courts in SEC injunctive actions,
the SEC in administrative actions cannot impose a penalty equal to
the amount of the net pecuniary gain if that amount is more than
10 6
the maximum for that tier."
The SEC also must determine that a monetary penalty is in the
public interest.' 0 7 The Commission may, but is not required to,
consider the following factors:
1. whether the act or omission involved fraud, deceit, manipulation, or deliberate or reckless disregard of a regulatory requirement;
2. the harm to others resulting either directly or indirectly from
the act or omission;
3. the extent to which any person was unjustly enriched, taking
into account any restitution made to persons injured by such behavior;
102. § 101, 104 Stat. at 932-33.
103. Pitt & Johnson, supra note 74.

104. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990,
§ 202, 104 Stat. 931, 937 (1990).
105. Phillips & Plaza, supra note 27, at 212.
106. Id.

107. § 202, 104 Stat. at 937.
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4. whether such person previously has been found by the SEC, another appropriate regulatory agency, or a self-regulatory organization
to have violated federal or state securities laws, or the rules of a SRO,
has been enjoined by a court of competent jurisdiction for violations of
such laws or rules, or has been convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction of violations of such laws or any felony or misdemeanor described in section 15(b)(4)(B);
5. the need to deter such person and others from committing such
acts or omissions;
6. the ability of the violator to pay the penalty;
and
1 08
7. such other matters as justice may require.
4. Restrictions on Corporate Service
SERPSRA provides the SEC "with the authority to seek orders
from the federal courts that prohibit persons found to have violated
certain anti-fraud provisions of the 1933 Act or the 1934 Act from
acting as a director or an officer of a public company."10 9 In order
to impose this remedy, the court is required to determine that the
person's conduct demonstrates "substantial unfitness" to serve as
an officer or director. 110 "Although Congress did not provide a definition of what constitutes substantial unfitness, Congress did indicate that 'the remedy of a bar or suspension from service as a
corporate officer or director is especially appropriate in cases in
which a defendant has engaged in fraudulent conduct while serving
in a corporate or other fiduciary capacity'.""' However, as restrictions on corporate service may only be imposed for violations of Sections 17(a) and 10(b), or the rules and regulations thereunder, the
problem again arises as to what level of scienter will be required to
impose liability under those sections. If a lesser standard of scienter is deemed to be sufficient, additional concerns may develop relating to the impact on securities lawyers and law firms, as many
securities lawyers hold positions on corporate boards of directors,
and occasionally as corporate officers.
B.

Implications for the Securities Lawyer

The enactment of SERPSRA has caused great concern among
the legal community due to the broad language used in its enforce108. Id. at 938.
109. Phillips & Plaza, supra note 27, at 209. SERPSRA provides that:
[Tihe court may prohibit, conditionally or unconditionally, and permanently or for such period as time as it shall determine, any person who
violated [Section 17(aXl) of the Securities Act or] Section 10(b) of [the Exchange Act] or the rules or regulations thereunder from acting as an officer
or director... if the person's conduct demonstrates substantial unfitness to
serve as an officer or director.
Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, § 201,
104 Stat. 931, 935-36 (1990).
110. Id.
111. Phillips & Plaza, supra note 27, at 220.
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ment provisions. Among the new enforcement powers granted in
SERPSRA, "the SEC can seek civil money penalties for any securities law violation and can issue cease and desist orders against violators, as well as anyone who is a cause of the violation." 112 "This
prohibited conduct could be broader than aiding and abetting and
1 13
could apply to lawyers."
In addition, "these new remedies allow the SEC to choose
whether to bypass the Federal courts and bring any case in its own
administrative forum." 114 "[O]ne Washington attorney warned
that if the SEC is not subject to the judicial checks imposed by the
injunctive process, the integrity of its enforcement program will
115
suffer."
But perhaps most troubling is the fact that the extent of these
broad remedies has yet to be defined by the SEC. The potential
liability under SERPSRA is devastating, and as yet there are no
clear guidelines as to how broadly it will be interpreted. From the
language employed in its provisions, SERPSRA includes virtually
everyone involved in securities transactions within the cross-hairs
of its arsenal of remedies, but fails to provide any guidance as to
when these remedies may be implemented. Although the Act was
designed, in part, to allow the SEC flexibility in tailoring remedies
for securities law violations, the SEC needs to define with substantial clarity the extent of liability under the Act in order to establish
some level of certainty in securities transactions.
In an attempt to quell the concerns of the legal community regarding potential liability under SERPSRA, Bruce Hiler, Associate
Director of the SEC Enforcement Division, told a group gathered for
the American Bar Association's annual convention on August 9,
1993 that, "[t]he Securities and Exchange Commission Enforcement Division is not targeting attorneys or brokerage industry compliance officials, but it does respond to trends that it sees in the
media and to congressional interest." 116 "The division may give the
impression that it is targeting a particular industry, but that is not
117
really true."
Hiler continued by saying that "the division takes a facts and
circumstances approach, considering various factors, such as the
need for deterrence and damage to the public."" 8 "[I]n deciding on
112. Peter C. Kostant, When Zeal Boils Over: Disclosure Obligationsand the
Duty of Candor of Legal Counsel in Regulatory Proceedings after the Kaye,
Scholer Settlement, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 487, 544-45 (1993).
113. Id. at 545.
114. Pitt & Johnson, supra note 74.
115. ABA Group, supra note 87.
116. SEC Isn't Targeting Attorneys, Others, Enforcement Official Says, 25
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1113 (1993) [hereinafter TargetingAttorneys].
117. Id.
118. Id.
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the appropriate target penalty, the staff does look at previous
cases."119 However, it also looks at "how much time has passed
since those cases, and whether things 'are getting out of hand,' the
perception of the conduct involved, and what the market will bear
as a penalty."120 "'As we gain experience,' Hiler noted, 'we'll look
at the deterrent effect we're having.'"121 "However, practitioners
are not going to be able to look at a case and say that X and Y are
122
the reasons why the violator got such and such a penalty."
III.

THE SUPREME COURT'S RECENT DECISION IN CENTRAL BANK

OF DENVER V FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF DENVER

On April 19, 1994 the Supreme Court issued its decision in
Central Bank of Denver v. FirstInterstateBank of Denver,123 a decision which may prove to be one of the most surprising and disappointing decisions in the history of securities law. Perhaps the
most alarming aspect of the Court's opinion is that the reasoning
which underlies the decision jeopardizes other existing remedies
which the SEC currently implements to police fraud in the market,
and to enforce the securities laws.
A.

Background

The facts leading up to this case, as set forth in the brief for the
Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae, 12 4 are as
follows. Central Bank of Denver (petitioner) served as indenture
trustee for two separate bond issues sold in 1986 and 1988 by the
Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building Authority to finance
public improvements to a planned community. The indenture required the bonds to be secured at all times by land having an appraised value of at least 160% of the outstanding principal and
interest.
In early 1988, before the second offering, petitioner received an
updated appraisal covering both the land securing the 1986 bonds
and the separate parcels that were to secure the 1988 bonds. The
new appraisal, prepared by the same individual who had supplied
the original appraisal in 1986, showed land values essentially unchanged from 1986, even though local real estate values had declined in the interim. The lead underwriter for the 1986 bonds
notified petitioner that the 160% test was not being met for those
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. TargetingAttorneys, supra note 116.

122. Id.
123. 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).

124. Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Central
Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1991) (No.
92-854) [hereinafter SEC Brief for Respondents].
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bonds, and expressed concern that the 1988 appraisal was unreliable. Petitioner's own investigation raised similar questions.
Petitioner, as trustee for the 1986 bonds, at first directed that
an independent review of the appraisal be conducted by a different
appraiser. After meetings with the issuer, the developer, and
others, however, petitioner agreed to defer the independent review
until late 1988, at least six months after the 1988 bonds were to be
sold. As one condition for petitioner's forbearance, the developer
agreed to pledge an additional $2 million in property as security for
the 1986 bonds. No additional property was pledged as security for
the 1988 bonds, which were sold as scheduled in June 1988. Thereafter the issuer refused to complete the promised independent appraisal, and ultimately defaulted on the 1988 bonds.
Respondents were purchasers of 1988 bonds who brought a securities fraud action against petitioner and others, alleging that the
1988 sale violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, and the Commission's Rule 10b-5. In particular, respondents
alleged that petitioner knowingly or recklessly aided and abetted
the fraud by withdrawing its demand for an immediate independent review of the appraisal despite serious concerns about its accuracy, and by agreeing to delay the review until after the 1988 bonds
had been sold.
The district court granted summary judgment for Central
Bank, holding that the scienter requirement for aiding and abetting
liability may not be satisfied by showing recklessness absent an additional duty to disclose, or a finding of a genuine issue of material
fact as to the bank's knowledge or a duty to disclose. The court of
appeals agreed that petitioner had no duty to disclose, but reversed
and remanded, holding that aiding and abetting liability based
upon recklessness could be established absent a duty to disclose
when the defendant assists the primary violation by "affirmative
action."
The issues to be resolved by the Court were: (1) Whether there
is an implied private right of action for aiding and abetting violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
SEC Rule 10b-5, and (2) what degree of scienter is required in order
to establish liability for aiding and abetting if an implied private
right of action does exist. The Supreme Court held, however, in a 54 decision, that because the text of Section 10(b) does not prohibit
the aiding and abetting of proscribed fraudulent conduct, a private
plaintiff is precluded from maintaining an action for aiding and
abetting under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.125 In so holding, the
Court not only sidestepped the issues before it, but also contravened nearly 30 years of judicial precedent that had been estab125. Central Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. at 1455.
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lished for aider and abettor liability. 126
The Court based its decision, that a cause of action for aiding
and abetting may not be brought under Section 10(b), upon two
principle methods of analysis. First, the text of Section 10(b) does
not expressly, or in terms, mention aiding and abetting liability.
Second, even if the text of the Section 10(b) does not resolve the
issue, the Court will attempt to infer how the 1934 Congress would
have addressed the issue. In the Court's opinion, the 1934 Congress likely would not have attached aiding and abetting liability to
Section 10(b) had it provided a private cause of action. Each of
these decisions will be explored further in turn.
126. "Instead of simply addressing the questions presented by the parties, on

which the law really was unsettled, the Court sua sponte directed the parties to
address a question on which even the petitioner justifiably thought the law was
settled, and reached out to overturn a most considerable body of precedent."
CentralBank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. at 1457 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Since 1966,
with the decision in Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp.
673, 680-81 (N.D. Ind. 1966), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), that "in the
absence of a clear legislative expression to the contrary, [Section 10(b)] must be
flexibly applied so as to implement its policies and purpose," recognition of
aider and abettor liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 has become commonplace, and indeed, "has become an important part of the Commission's enforcement arsenal." Central Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. at 1460 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). "In hundreds of judicial and administrative proceedings in every
circuit in the federal system, the courts and the SEC have concluded that aiders
and abettors are subject to liability under Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5." Id. at
1457. This has created a foundation of precedent which has provided a sufficient level of certainty and predictability through a clear delineation of the necessary elements required in order to impose liability as an aider and abettor
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
The elements that have developed to establish an aiding and abetting claim
under Section 10(b) are (1) that there be a primary fraud, (2) that the aider and
abettor have "knowledge" of the fraud, and (3) that the aider and abettor provide "substantial assistance" to the achievement of the primary fraud. IIT v.
Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980). Other courts have used variations of
this test to achieve slightly different results. For example, the Seventh Circuit's test is more restrictive, requiring that the aider and abettor (1) commit
one of the manipulative or deceptive acts prohibited under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 (2) with the same degree of scienter that primary liability requires.
Robin v. Arthur Young & Co., 915 F.2d 1120, 1123 (7th Cir. 1990). In addition,
the Ninth Circuit has recently restated the elements as follows: (1) the existence of an independent primary wrong; (2) actual knowledge by the alleged
aider and abettor of the wrong and of his or her role in furthering it; and (3)
substantial assistance in the wrong. Harmsen v. Smith, 693 F.2d 932, 943 (9th
Cir. 1982). However, as Judge Friendly, writing for the Second Circuit, explained: "Although this list of prerequisites has become commonplace, the exact content of its rather vague phrases, especially "knowledge". . . is still being
delineated by the courts." IT, 619 F.2d at 922.
The two primary issues that have developed, and which have caused genuine disagreement among the lower courts, are whether there is an implied private right of action for aiding and abetting violations of Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5, and the degree of scienter that is required in order to establish liability.
Not coincidentally, these were the same two issues before the Court in Central
Bank of Denver. It was because of this fact that the legal community, bench
and bar alike, awaited with heightened anticipation for the issuance of the
Court's opinion.
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The Court began by stating that, "[w]ith respect.., to the scope
of conduct prohibited by Section 10(b), the text of the statute controls our decision." 12 7 The statutory language is the starting point
in every case involving construction of a statute, and a private
plaintiff may not bring a 10b-5 suit against a defendant for acts not
prohibited by the text of Section 10(b). 128 The language of Section
10(b) does not in terms mention aiding and abetting. Since Congress knew how to impose aiding and abetting liability when it
wanted to do so, it presumably would have used the words "aid" and
"abet" in the statutory context of Section 10(b) if that was its intention.129 The Court held, therefore, that the statute prohibited only
the making of a material misstatement (or omission) or the commission of a manipulative act, not the giving of aid to a person who
0
commits a manipulative or deceptive act.13
Since the case concerned the conduct prohibited by Section
10(b), in the Court's opinion, the statute itself resolved the case.1 3 1
However, the Court went on to state that even if the statute did not
resolve the case, it would have reached the same conclusion because
"[w]hen the text of Section 10(b) does not resolve a particular issue,
[the Court] attempts to infer how the 1934 Congress would have
addressed the issue had the 10b-5 action been included as an express provision in the 1934 Act."1 3 2 Since Congress did not include
private aiding and abetting liability in any of the express causes of
action in the Securities Acts, the Court inferred that Congress
likely would not have included aiding and abetting liability in Sec13 3
tion 10(b) had it provided a private cause of action.
Furthermore, the Court stated that "[i]t is impossible to assert
with any degree of assurance that Congressional failure to act represents affirmative Congressional approval of the [court's] statutory interpretation." 134 "Congressional inaction lacks persuasive
significance because several equally tenable inferences may be
drawn from such inaction .... ,,135 Although conceding that the
Court's prior cases have not been consistent in rejecting such arguments, the Court concluded that Congress would not have included
aiding and abetting liability in Section 10(b), and that "it is not
plausible to interpret the statutory silence as tantamount to an im127. Id. at 1446.
128. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct.

1439, 1446 (1994).

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 1448.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct.

1439, 1449 (1994).

134. Id. at 1453 (quoting Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496
U.S. 633, 650 (1990)).
135. Id.
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plicit Congressional intent [to do so]." x38
Finally, the Court stated that policy considerations cannot
override its interpretation of the text and structure of the Act, "except to the extent that they may help to show that adherence to the
text and structure would lead to a result so bizarre that Congress
13 7
could not have intended it."
The policy arguments espoused by
the SEC in its brief as Amicus Curiae evidently did not meet this
standard set by the Court.
In attempting to address the potential alternatives that were
available to the Court in making this decision, the progression of
cases decided by the Court regarding the determination of whether
a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one
138
must be considered. In 1975, the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash
set forth four factors that it considered "relevant" in determining
whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one. l3 9 The four factors it considered relevant are: (1)
whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose benefit the statute
was enacted, (2) whether there is any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny
one, (3) whether it is consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff, and (4)
whether the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state
law so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action
based solely on federal law. 140 The Court failed to state, however,
whether each factor would be given equal weight, or whether one
factor would be given more weight than the others.
Four years later, in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,14' the
Supreme Court refined its analysis set forth in Cort by making it
clear that each of the four factors stated there do not carry equal
weight. 142 "The ultimate question is one of Congressional intent,
not one of whether this Court thinks that it can improve upon the
statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law." 1 43 Therefore,
under the analysis set forth in Touche, in order for the Court to find
that a cause of action for aiding and abetting liability does exist
under Section 10(b), it must find that Congress implicitly intended
to create such a cause of action when it enacted Section 10(b) in
1934.
136. Id. at 1452.
137. Id. at 1454.
138. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).

139. Id. at 78.
140. Id.
141.

442 U.S. 560 (1979).

142. SODERQUIST, supra note 14, at 274.
143. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979).
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Additional language in Touche, referring to Section 17(a) of the
1934 Act, stated that since two other provisions of the 1934 Act explicitly provided for private causes of action, the fact that Section
17(a) did not is strong evidence that Congress did not intend to do
144
SO.
The reasoning for such analysis seems to be that, since Congress knew how to impose a private cause of action when it wanted
to do so, the fact that a provision does not provide for such a remedy
is strong evidence that Congress did not intend for one to be available under that provision. Therefore, the explicit language in certain provisions of the 1934 Act providing for aiding and abetting
liability provides strong evidence that Congress specifically chose
not to provide this remedy under other provisions of the Act not
expressly including such language. Since Section 10(b) does not expressly provide for aider and abettor liability, the analysis of
Touche would indicate that an action for aider and abettor liability
under that provision is without basis.
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran,i 4 5

however, the Supreme Court took a more expansive approach to implied remedies by holding that leaving "intact the statutory provisions under which the federal courts had implied a cause of action
is itself evidence that Congress affirmatively intended to preserve
that remedy."' 46 This approach departs from the older analysis of
Cort and Touche, which based Congressional intent on the actions
and inactions of Congress at the time of the enactment of the 1934
Act, not taking into account current market developments which
were not present at the time of the Act's enactment. The approach
in Merrill Lynch allows the judiciary to take a more responsive approach to changing conditions in the market without the time consuming process of legislative action, and without having to justify
its actions under the Congressional mindset of 1934, by permitting
the Court to infer Congressional intent from the acquiescence of
Congress to current judicial activity. As the lower courts have consistently permitted an implied private cause of action for aider and
abettor liability under Section 10(b) without Congressional interference, the analysis in Merrill Lynch provided the most logical basis
for decision in Central Bank of Denver.
As stated in Justice Stevens' dissent in CentralBank of Denver,
a "settled construction of an important federal statute should not be
disturbed unless and until Congress so decides.' 47 "A policy of respect for consistent judicial and administrative interpretations
leaves it to elected representatives to assess settled law and to eval144. Id. at 571.
145. 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
146. SODERQUIST, supra note 14, at 275.

147. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct.
1439, 1457 (1994) (Stevens, J. dissenting).

1994]

Walking On Thin Ice

uate the merits and demerits of changing it." 148 "Even when there
is no affirmative evidence of ratification, the Legislature's failure to
reject a consistent judicial or administrative construction counsels

hesitation from a court asked to invalidate

it."149

Perhaps the greatest proponent of permitting aider and abettor
liability, together with private enforcement, under Section 10(b) is
the SEC. In its brief as Amicus Curiae in Central Bank of Denver,
the SEC set forth several policy reasons for permitting such a cause
of action. First, the Commission has only limited resources to detect or investigate federal securities law violations, and private actions accordingly serve as "a -necessary supplement to Commission
action."1 5 0 The existing private right of action's "effectiveness as a
supplement to Commission enforcement would be severely undercut if it did not also reach aiders and abettors." 15 1 Second, "private
actions also serve the compensatory purposes of the securities
laws."1 52 "Although the Commission may seek certain monetary
relief, its remedies are designed primarily to deter violations by
making them unprofitable, rather than to make investors
whole." 1 5 3 "Accordingly, the primary means of compensating injured investors remains the private action, and all participants in a
fraud should be liable in order to ensure full recovery."1 5 4 Finally,
it has long been settled in the lower courts that private plaintiffs
may sue aiders and abettors under Rule lOb-5." 15 5 In fact, no court
has held to the contrary.' 5 6 "[A]ny decision to reverse direction and
reject aider and abettor liability under Rule 10b-5 would, at this
57
late date, be better left to Congress."'
The analysis of the Court in Merrill Lynch, by permitting a
broader interpretation of Congressional intent, would have allowed
the Court the flexibility to consider the special needs of the SEC, to
uphold the progression of decisions in the lower courts, and to more
readily respond to issues causing concern in the market that were
not contemplated at the time of the Act's enactment. Concerns that
such judicial activism may encroach upon the jurisdiction of the
Legislature are unfounded, as the Legislature is still able to express
its intent, or correct a misinterpretation by the judiciary, by amending those provisions of the Act which it feels need clarification. The
bottom line is that the Legislature cannot anticipate all issues that
148. Id.

149. Id.
150. SEC Brieffor Respondents, supra note 124.

151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

155. SEC Brief for Respondents, supra note 124.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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may arise in the securities markets, nor can it draft statutory language that will cover all possible occurrences. Therefore, the Court
must be given some latitude in its ability to interpret the provisions
of the Act in light of changing market needs. The analysis set forth
in Merrill Lynch permits this latitude.
The Court, however, reverted back to its prior analysis of
Touche in its decision to reject aider and abettor liability under Section 10(b) and did not consider the policy arguments proffered by
the SEC. Issues such as the vast amount of investors that are affected by transactions in the securities markets; the inability of the
SEC to adequately monitor all transactions and detect fraudulent
conduct due to its limited resources; and the entitlement of plaintiffs to full recovery from all persons responsible under Section
10(b) should have been taken into account as the Court made its
decision whether to allow aiding and abetting liability under Section 10(b). The more reasoned approach for the Court would have
been to continue its analysis set forth in Merrill Lynch, and to uphold not only aiding and abetting liability under Section 10(b), but
also an implied private right of action for aiding and abetting
liability.
B.

The Issue of Scienter

By sidestepping the issues presented by the parties, the Court
failed to address the question of what level of scienter is required to
establish liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, either as a
primary violator or as an aider and abettor. In Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder,'5 8 the Court noted in footnote 12 of its opinion that in
certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a form of
intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability but declined
to address the question of whether reckless behavior would be sufficient to create civil liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.1 59
Since that decision in 1976, the Court has failed to clarify the scienter requirement of Section 10(b) and has left the Courts of Appeal
divided. In Central Bank of Denver,160 the Court once again had
the opportunity to address the issue but failed to do so.
The issue of scienter is of such importance under Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 that it warrants a discussion of the current approaches taken by the lower courts. Since the decision of the Court
in Central Bank of Denver was merely a 5-4 majority, and because
Congress has not had an opportunity to act in response to the
Court's decision, the following discussion will also include the level
158. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
159. Id. at 193 n.12.
160. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct
1439 (1994).
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of scienter required for aider and abettor liability, even though the
Court has held that such a remedy does not exist under Section
10(b).
The reason for requiring some level of knowledge of the fraud
before imposing liability as an aider and abettor is to exclude those
persons from liability that innocently and inadvertently contribute
to the fraud absent any awareness of its existence. Without the
requirement of some level of knowledge, a wide range of persons
would face liability for facilitating roles in transactions which
seemed ordinary and honest to them, and "the securities laws
would become an amorphous snare for guilty and innocent
alike." 16 1 The question that arises is what level of scienter is required under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to satisfy the knowledge
requirement, and to establish liability as an aider and abettor. As
the Court in Ernst & Ernst failed to decide the issue, it has been up

to the lower courts to establish if, and when, recklessness will be
sufficient to impose liability.
There are several reasons why a recklessness standard may be
preferable, in certain circumstances, to one requiring conscious intent on the part of the defendant. One reason would be to discourage deliberate ignorance of facts indicating fraud and to prevent a
defendant from escaping liability simply by denying any conscious
intent to defraud. 162 Furthermore, proof of a defendant's knowledge or intent will often be inferential, and to require that a fact
finder must find a specific intent to deceive or defraud in all types of
10b-5 cases would for all intents and purposes disembowel the private cause of action under Section 10(b). 16 3 Another reason for applying a recklessness standard for aiding and abetting is that it
comports with the purposes of Section 10(b).16 4 "Section 10(b)
serves broad remedial purposes, and [the Court] has stated that the
securities laws should be liberally construed to effectuate those purposes."1 65 "By facilitating enforcement of Rule 10b-5, the recklessness standard promotes the Congressional policy embodied in the
1934 Act." 16 6 The lower courts have developed three approaches in
analyzing the scienter requirement: the "duty" approach (majority
view), 16 7 the "assistance by action" approach,' 6 8 and the "sliding
161. Alan R. Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud: A CriticalExamination, 52 ALB. L. REV. 637, 671-72 (1988) (quoting
Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975)).
162. SEC Brief for Respondents, supra note 124.

163. Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 161, at 680 (quoting Rolf v. Blyth,
Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44-47 (2nd. Cir. 1978)).
164. SEC Brief for Respondents, supra note 124.
165. Id.

166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Brief for Petitioner, Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994) (No. 92-854) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
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scale" approach. 169
1.

The "Duty"Approach

In applying the "duty" approach, the majority of courts have
held that recklessness does not suffice for Rule 10b-5 aiding and
1 70
abetting liability absent a breach of some duty to disclose or act.
"[Without] such a breach, a plaintiff must always prove conscious
intent to defraud, even if the defendant's substantial assistance
consisted of affirmative action." 17 1 Silence on the part of the defendant can be misleading or deceptive where there is some relationship which reasonably creates in another person the
expectation that the defendant would take steps to protect that person's interests. 172 Such an expectation is reasonable, however, only
where there was a preexisting duty to disclose or act. 173 "[T]his
duty does not come from section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5; if it did the
inquiry would be circular."1 74 "[Instead, t]he duty must come from
1 75
a fiduciary relation outside securities law."
There are generally three situations in which an attorney will
have a pre-existing duty to disclose, thereby permitting the use of a
recklessness standard: (1) when acting on behalf of a client who
has a duty to disclose information to third parties; 17 6 (2) when preparing legal documents intended for the benefit of third parties,
and upon which they rely; 177 and (3) towards his own client. 178 Ab169.
170.
171.
172.

SEC Brief for Respondents, supra note 124.
Id.; see also Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 496 (4th Cir. 1991).
SEC Brief for Respondents, supra note 124.
Brief for Petitioner,supra note 168.

173. Id.
174. Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 496 (7th
Cir. 1986).
175. Id.
176. In SEC v. National Student Mktg Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C.
1978), the lawyers' duties to their corporate client made them aiders and abettors by silence and inaction when they failed to reveal material information to

the shareholders prior to the closing of the transaction.
177. In Abell v. Potomac Insurance Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1124 (D.D.C. 1978),
the court explained that the law, as a general rule, only recognizes causes of

action by third parties against attorneys for the insufficiency of their legal opinions if they can prove that the attorney prepared specific legal documents for
the benefit of the plaintiff that represent explicitly the legal opinion of the attorney preparing them. Accord Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 492 (4th Cir.
1991). A lawyer cannot be held liable for misrepresentation under Section 10(b)
for failing to disclose information about a client to a third party absent some
fiduciary or other confidential relationship with the third party. Id. at 490.
178. In Morgan v. Prudential Groups, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 957, 961 (S.D.N.Y.

1981), aff'd, 729 F.2d 1443 (2nd Cir. 1983), the court held that attorneys can be
held liable as aiders and abettors if, in reckless disregard of the truth, they omit
material information, or include erroneous information, from documents they
draft where it is reasonably foreseeable that potential investors will rely on
such documents. See also Andreo v. Friedlander, Gaines, Cohen, Rosenthal &
Rosenberg, 660 F. Supp. 1362, 1367 (D.Conn. 1987). The court explained that

this does not mean that attorneys have an affirmative duty to verify all infor-
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sent any pre-existing duty to disclose by the defendant, a plaintiff
must prove conscious intent to defraud in order to invoke a recklessness standard.
The reasoning behind application of the "duty" approach is that
where the defendant owes some duty to the plaintiff, reckless acts
which otherwise would not be actionable under the securities laws
may fairly be regarded as deceptive in nature. 179 Where the defendant knows he is subject to a duty to disclose, liability may properly be imposed when he subsequently acts in reckless disregard of
that duty. It is this pre-existing duty that should put the defendant
on notice that his conduct will be subject to greater scrutiny, and,
therefore, permits the just application of a recklessness standard of
scienter.
2.

The "Assistanceby Action" Approach

Under the "assistance by action" approach, recklessness will
suffice for aiding and abetting liability under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 whenever the defendant has taken affirmative action to
assist a fraudulent scheme. In the Seventh Circuit, for example, "a
defendant may be held liable for aiding and abetting a securities
fraud if he substantially aids the fraud and either knew of the fraud
or was reckless in failing to discover it."' 8 0
Although this approach would alleviate the burden of proving
intent to defraud by permitting recklessness to satisfy the scienter
requirement when a defendant has taken some affirmative action
to assist the fraud, it appears that many innocent contributors, ignorant of any fraudulent scheme, may be caught up in its overreaching presumptions and subject to liability for conduct only later
deemed to be reckless. The practical effect of this approach on persons assisting in securities transactions is to "bootstrap a duty
where none exists," and to "create an unwarranted presumption
that the alleged aider and abettor intended to defraud the plaintiff
simply because his conduct was later judged as reckless."' 8 1
3.

The "Sliding Scale" Approach

Under the 'sliding scale' approach, scienter depends "both on
the nature of the conduct and on whether the defendant had a duty
mation provided by their clients, or to discover if any pertinent information
might have been omitted, but rather imposes a responsibility not to act in reckless disregard of the truth when using the information provided by their clients.
Id.
179. See Brief for Petitioner,supra note 168.
180. Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 161, at 677 (quoting Tucker v.
Janota, (1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,701 (N.D.Ill. Nov.
1, 1978)).
181. Brief for Petitioner,supra note 168.
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to disclose." 18 2 . The level of evidence required to prove actual
knowledge may increase where the defendant's participation in the
alleged wrongdoing is less substantial.' 8 3 A defendant who affirmatively acts to assist a fraudulent scheme, but who has no duty to
disclose, is liable for aiding and abetting only if the plaintiff can
prove "conscious intent," unless the character and degree of his
assistance in the fraud is particularly unusual, in which case recklessness will suffice.' 8 4 Where some special duty of disclosure exists, then liability can be imposed if the plaintiff can show reckless
85
conduct on the part of defendant.I
This approach permits recklessness to satisfy the scienter requirement of aiding and abetting liability when the defendant has a
duty to disclose or, in the absence of such a duty, if his affirmative
actions constitute unusual conduct. Accordingly, this approach appears to be an attempt to achieve a compromise between the other
two methods of analyzing the scienter requirement: If a duty to
disclose exists, recklessness will suffice ("duty" approach), and if defendant undertakes some affirmative action, regardless of a duty to
disclose, recklessness will suffice if the conduct is unusual (quasi"assistance by action" approach).
Although all three approaches have each found favor in opinions of the lower courts, the "duty" approach has been used in a
majority of jurisdictions and seems to provide the most logical basis
for permitting recklessness to satisfy the scienter requirement for
aider and abettor liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Not
only does this approach comport with the traditional view of the
attorney-client relationship, ensuring that client information will
not be forcibly disclosed absent some duty on the part of the defendant to do so, but it also promotes fairness by providing notice to a
potential defendant that his conduct may later be subject to judicial
scrutiny under a recklessness standard. Absent such a duty to disclose, the plaintiff must show a conscious intent to defraud on the
part of the defendant.

182. SEC Brief for Respondents, supra note 124.
183. Brieffor Petitioner,supra note 168.
184. SEC Brief for Respondents, supra note 124. See Akin v. Q-L Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 531 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Woodward v. Metro
Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975)). In Akin, the court stated that
an accountant may be held liable for recklessly aiding and abetting a primary
violation, regardless of whether he has made misrepresentations of his own,
when his assistance in the fraud is particularly substantial and unusual or
when he owes some special duty of disclosure. Id.
185. IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 925 (2nd Cir. 1980) (quoting Woodward,
522 F.2d at 97).
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C. Central Bank of Denver and its Implications for the
Securities Lawyer
As stated previously, the failure of the Court once again to address the question of what level of scienter is required under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to establish liability, as either a primary
violator or an aider and abettor, is a tragic disservice to the securities industry. The Supreme Court must determine whether recklessness may be sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement, and,
if so, the appropriate circumstances which would fairly permit its
application. Such a decision is necessary, not only to provide uniformity among the lower courts, but to provide some level of assurance for securities lawyers that they will not be subject to liability
for conduct only later deemed to be reckless.
Perhaps the most alarming aspect of the Court's opinion, however, is the analysis the Court used in reaching its conclusion. The
reasoning which underlies the Court's decision, that aider and abettor liability is not available under Section 10(b) since such conduct
is not expressly prohibited by the text of the statute, jeopardizes
other existing remedies which the SEC currently implements to police fraud in the market and to enforce the securities laws.186 One
example may be the private right of action for primary liability
which is implied under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
One saving grace is the knowledge that, "when a decision of the
Supreme Court upsets settled law, Congress may step in to reinstate the old law." 18 7 Perhaps this was what the majority had in

mind when issuing this opinion, to force the Legislature to expressly state its intent concerning the extent of liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, rather than rely upon implied causes of
action that have developed in the courts, despite long-standing acceptance by the courts. Whatever the reason for their decision, the
Court has now cast more uncertainty upon the future of securities
law enforcement than existed prior to its decision. It is for this reason that the Court's analysis must be considered suspect, and its
result disappointing.
CONCLUSION

"The Securities and Exchange Commission, with its small staff
and limited resources, [cannot] implement the objectives of its dis186. "[T]he majority's approach to aiding and abetting at the very least casts
serious doubt, both for private and SEC actions, on other forms of secondary
liability that, like the aiding and abetting theory, have long been recognized by
the SEC and the courts but are not expressly spelled out in the securities statutes." Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct.
1439, 1460 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 1459 n.7.
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closure policy without the cooperation of the legal profession, [and
they] must rely heavily on them to perform their tasks diligently
and responsibly." l s8 Consequently, "safeguards to protect the investing public depend 'in large measure on the attorneys who serve
in an advisory capacity to those engaged in securities

transactions.'

"189

It is because of this "unique and pivotal role that securities
lawyers play in the effective implementation of securities laws" 190
that the level of disclosure required of them under traditional ethical standards has recently been questioned. The answer, however,
to preventing potential abuse by those that would gain by this role
does not lie in an increase in disclosure obligations of securities
lawyers, but rather in the more effective use of the current regulatory framework.
As is evident from the previous discussion, securities lawyers
currently face an increase in potential liability through the newly
acquired administrative remedies available to the SEC with the enactment of SERPSRA. In addition, the decision of the Supreme
Court in Central Bank of Denver leaves open the question of
whether recklessness may be a sufficient level of scienter to impose
liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Even though the
Court has eliminated aider and abettor liability under Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5, thereby reducing a major source of concern for securities lawyers, there is no guarantee that Congress will not legislate in response to the Court's decision. As a result, the potential
liability of securities lawyers appears to be as uncertain as ever
before, and any further increase in potential liability through
heightened disclosure requirements would, in effect, render the securities lawyer incapable of maintaining a traditional attorney-client relationship.

188. Kostant, supra note 112, at 537.
189. Id. (quoting SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., [1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 93,631 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1972)).
190. SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., [1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,631 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1972).

